By Manny Fernandez

November 19, 2026

nginx HTTP/2 RCE: CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633, Check, Mitigate, Patch

nginx HTTP/2 RCE: CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633, Check, Mitigate, Patch

Disclosed: November 18, 2026 | Severity: Critical, CVSS 4.0 9.2 (F5) | Fixed in: nginx 1.30.7 (stable), 1.31.9 (mainline), NGINX Plus 37.0.8.1 / 37.3.0.1

Executive Summary

F5 just shipped fixes for a nginx HTTP/2 RCE pair: CVE-2026-123007, an integer underflow in HTTP/2 flow control, and CVE-2026-123633, a use-after-free in HTTP/2 connection handling. Both are unauthenticated, both need HTTP/2 enabled, and both got a CVSS 4.0 score of 9.2. The first one has been in the code since HTTP/2 landed in nginx 1.9.5 back in 2015, and Rapid7 has already published a working proof of concept for it.

I kept both CVEs in one post on purpose. They live in the same module, they are fixed by the same release, and the same stopgap (turning HTTP/2 off) covers both. Splitting them would mean running the same checks twice. Where they differ is who is exposed, so each one gets its own section below.

Objective: find every nginx that is in scope, put a stopgap in place where you cannot patch tonight, then patch and prove the patch is actually running.

Target audience: Linux and web admins, platform and Kubernetes teams running ingress or API gateways, and security engineers who have to answer “are we exposed?” before the morning standup.

CVE-2026-123007 CVE-2026-123633
Bug class Integer underflow in HTTP/2 send window (CWE-191) Use-after-free on an HTTP/2 connection (nickname: Drainbreak)
nginx OSS affected 1.9.5 through 1.31.8 1.19.7 through 1.31.8
In scope when HTTP/2 is enabled, even serving static files HTTP/2 to clients + proxy_pass to a backend + worker low on worker_connections
NGINX Plus fixed 37.0.8.1, 37.3.0.1 37.0.7.1, 37.2.0.1
Public PoC Yes (Rapid7) None public at time of writing
Disabling HTTP/2 helps Yes Yes

Prerequisites and Architecture

  • Shell access with sudo on each nginx host, or kubectl access to the cluster running an nginx-based ingress.
  • Comfort reading nginx -T output and editing server blocks.
  • A box outside your network (or at least outside the load balancer) with openssl and curl to test what clients actually negotiate.
  • A maintenance window that allows a full restart of nginx, not just a reload.

Diagram of the nginx HTTP/2 attack path showing where CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633 are reachable

Component Lab value Role
Client / attacker 198.18.50.10 Opens a long-lived HTTP/2 over TLS connection
Optional front end CDN, WAF, FortiWeb, load balancer If it terminates HTTP/2, attacker frames may never reach nginx
nginx edge 198.18.10.20:443 (web01) listen 443 ssl with HTTP/2 enabled
Backend upstream 10.0.20.15:8080 Reached by proxy_pass, needed for CVE-2026-123633

CVE-2026-123007: the 11-year-old flow-control bug

When a client cancels a stream, nginx refunds the unused send allowance back to the connection window without checking the HTTP/2 maximum. Push that counter past the limit, and the later WINDOW_UPDATE bounds check, done with unsigned math, wraps around and lets the window keep growing. Eventually the oversized value is treated as a negative length on the output path and you get an out-of-bounds memory copy. Wiz walks through the exact functions involved in their write-up.

  • Reach: Wiz demonstrated it over HTTPS on 64-bit systems serving static files only, no backend and no third-party modules. If HTTP/2 is on, you are in scope.
  • Impact: code execution as the nginx worker. Xint chained it with an unpatched Linux kernel SCTP flaw to get root on the host, including from nginx inside a Docker container (Qualys summary).
  • PoC: Rapid7 published a full unauthenticated RCE exploit. Per Rapid7, it needs about 128 GB of HTTP/2 traffic (roughly 2 minutes at 10 Gbit/s, 17 minutes at 1 Gbit/s), x86-64 glibc with AVX-512, and an ASLR bypass.
  • Status: no in-the-wild exploitation and not in CISA KEV as of November 18, per Tenable.

CVE-2026-123633: Drainbreak, the reverse-proxy use-after-free

This one needs a specific shape. An HTTP/2 connection waiting on a partial HEADERS frame goes onto nginx’s reusable-connection list, and it is not taken off when the request stream gets created. When the worker runs short of free connection slots, nginx drains reusable connections, picks this one, and on an error path frees memory the in-flight request is still using.

  • In scope when: HTTP/2 to clients, requests passed to a backend with proxy_pass, and a worker running low on worker_connections. A pure static site is not the target here; a reverse proxy, API gateway, or ingress is.
  • Downstream blast radius: Metnir reproduced it in OpenResty and crashed the shipped binaries of Kong, Apache APISIX, NGINX Gateway Fabric, and community ingress-nginx, all of which enable HTTP/2 by default (CSO Online).
  • Exploit time: Metnir’s exploit took about 10 minutes with ASLR on, almost all of it spent defeating ASLR.
  • Status: no public PoC and no known exploitation at time of writing.

Step-by-Step: Check, Mitigate, Patch nginx HTTP/2 RCE

Step 1: Inventory the version and the build

Goal: know which hosts run an affected build with the HTTP/2 module compiled in.

Action: run on every nginx host. nginx -v alone is not enough, because distros backport fixes without bumping the version, so check the package changelog too.

nginx -v
nginx -V 2>&1 | grep -o -- '--with-http_v2_module'

# Debian / Ubuntu: count changelog hits for the fixes
apt changelog nginx 2>/dev/null | grep -cE 'CVE-2026-(123007|123633)'

# RHEL / Rocky / Alma
rpm -q --changelog nginx | grep -E 'CVE-2026-(123007|123633)'

Verification: a version in 1.9.5 to 1.30.6 or 1.31.0 to 1.31.8, the module flag printed, and zero changelog hits means the host is unpatched.

Step 2: Confirm HTTP/2 is enabled in the loaded config

Goal: separate “module compiled in” from “actually listening with HTTP/2”.

Action: dump the full running config and grep both syntaxes, the old listen ... http2 parameter and the newer http2 on; directive.

sudo nginx -T 2>&1 | sed 's/#.*//' | grep -nE 'listen[[:space:]].*http2|^[[:space:]]*http2[[:space:]]+on[[:space:]]*;'

# For CVE-2026-123633 scoping: is this box a reverse proxy, and how many slots?
sudo nginx -T 2>&1 | grep -nE 'proxy_pass|worker_connections'

Verification: any match on the first command puts the host in scope for CVE-2026-123007. Matches for both http2 and proxy_pass add CVE-2026-123633.

Step 3: Test what clients actually negotiate

Goal: see the server the way an attacker does. A CDN or load balancer can hide HTTP/2 on the nginx port, so test the nginx port directly too.

openssl s_client -connect <HOST>:443 -servername <HOST> -alpn h2 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -E 'ALPN protocol:|No ALPN negotiated'

curl -skI --http2 https://<HOST>/ | head -1

Verification: ALPN protocol: h2 and HTTP/2 200 mean HTTP/2 is live. No ALPN negotiated and HTTP/1.1 200 mean it is off.

Step 4: Patch, then restart (not reload)

Goal: run nginx 1.30.7 or 1.31.9 (or NGINX Plus 37.0.8.1 / 37.3.0.1). NGINX Plus R33 to R36 get no fix, so those move to 37.x.

Action: as of disclosure day, distro packages (Ubuntu, Debian, RHEL, Amazon Linux, Alpine) and the official nginx:stable and nginx:mainline Docker images were still pending, per ComputingForGeeks. Until your distro ships, the nginx.org repo is the fastest path. Example on Rocky / RHEL with the nginx.org nginx-stable repo configured:

sudo dnf remove nginx nginx-core
sudo dnf install nginx-1.30.7
sudo nginx -t
sudo systemctl restart nginx
nginx -v

Verification: nginx version: nginx/1.30.7, and no workers left from the old binary:

ps -o pid,lstart,cmd -C nginx

Every worker should show a start time after your restart. Then rebuild container images, Helm charts, golden AMIs, and autoscaling templates so the old build does not come back on the next scale-out.

Step 5: Stopgap if you cannot patch tonight: turn HTTP/2 off

Goal: close both CVEs until the patched build is in. This does nothing for the other three NGINX2Root CVEs (resolver, HTTP/3, mail proxy), so it is a bridge, not a fix.

Action, nginx 1.25.1 and newer: remove http2 from every listen line AND set http2 off; in each server block.

server {
    listen 443 ssl;          # was: listen 443 ssl http2;
    http2 off;
    server_name www.example.com;
    ...
}

# main context: cap how long old workers keep draining HTTP/2 clients
worker_shutdown_timeout 30s;

Action, builds older than 1.25.1 (Ubuntu 24.04, 22.04, Debian 12): only remove http2 from the listen lines. Do not add http2 off;, those versions do not know the directive and nginx -t fails.

sudo nginx -t && sudo systemctl reload nginx

Action, ingress-nginx on Kubernetes: flip the ConfigMap option. The project is no longer maintained, so plan the migration while you are in there.

kubectl -n ingress-nginx patch configmap ingress-nginx-controller --type merge -p '{"data":{"use-http2":"false"}}'

Verification: rerun Step 3 from outside. You want No ALPN negotiated. Browsers fall back to HTTP/1.1 fine, but native gRPC breaks, so warn those app owners first.

Step 6: Where a Fortinet front end fits

Goal: buy time at the perimeter, without pretending it replaces the patch.

Wiz notes that a CDN or WAF terminating HTTP/2 in front of nginx may partly mitigate exploitation, and Rapid7 notes that proxied HTTP/2 connections will likely not relay the attacker’s frames in a way the known exploit needs. A FortiWeb in reverse-proxy mode, or any front end that terminates the client’s HTTP/2 session and opens its own connection to nginx, fits that description. Two cautions:

  • Validate it. Run the Step 3 ALPN test against the nginx origin IP from a host that bypasses the front end, and lock the origin down so only the front end can reach port 443.
  • Check the FortiGuard Encyclopedia for IPS and virtual patch coverage for these CVE IDs before claiming it in a change ticket. I could not confirm a published signature at the time of writing.

Verification and Validation

Test Command Expected after the fix
Version nginx -v nginx/1.30.7 or nginx/1.31.9
Distro backport apt changelog nginx | grep -cE ‘CVE-2026-(123007|123633)’ 2 or more hits
Workers on new binary ps -o pid,lstart,cmd -C nginx All start times after the restart
Stopgap holding openssl s_client … -alpn h2 No ALPN negotiated
Config valid sudo nginx -t syntax is ok / test is successful
$ nginx -v
nginx version: nginx/1.30.7

$ sudo nginx -t
nginx: the configuration file /etc/nginx/nginx.conf syntax is ok
nginx: configuration file /etc/nginx/nginx.conf test is successful

Troubleshooting and Gotchas

1. http2 off; is set but ALPN still says h2

ComputingForGeeks found that http2 off; is ignored when any listen line for that address still carries the http2 parameter. One forgotten vhost on the same IP and port keeps HTTP/2 alive for all of them.

sudo nginx -T 2>&1 | grep -nE 'listen[[:space:]].*http2'

Fix: this must return nothing. Strip http2 from every remaining listen line, then nginx -t and reload.

2. Patched package installed, but still vulnerable

A reload keeps the old master process and the old binary in memory, and draining workers can keep serving HTTP/2 for a long time.

ps -o pid,lstart,cmd -C nginx | grep 'shutting down'

Fix: sudo systemctl restart nginx after any package change, and set worker_shutdown_timeout 30s; so stragglers do not hang around for an hour.

3. nginx -v says vulnerable, scanner says patched (or the reverse)

Distros backport security fixes into older version numbers. Ubuntu 22.04 ships 1.18.0, which is below the CVE-2026-123633 range but still inside CVE-2026-123007. Trust the package changelog and the vendor tracker over the version string, and test the origin port directly if a CDN or load balancer sits in front.

Sources

  1. Wiz Research: Unauthenticated RCE in NGINX, CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007
  2. Rapid7: CVE-2026-123007 Critical NGINX HTTP/2 Integer Underflow Leads to RCE
  3. Qualys: NGINX2Root, five nginx flaws led by CVE-2026-123007
  4. Tenable: NGINX2Root FAQ, five critical NGINX vulnerabilities
  5. CSO Online: AI unearths internet breaker flaws in Nginx web server
  6. ComputingForGeeks: nginx CVE-2026-123007, check, disable HTTP/2, patch

No fluff. Just the config that works.

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